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INTRODUCTION
This paper is about the primary campaign of Senator
Eugene McCarthy in the State of Indiana in 1968. It will
focus its attention on Indianapolis, the largest city and the
capital of the state, and an area where the Senator did quite
poorly. (1) Though some magazine articles, newspaper stories
and books have been useful, this paper is basically the
campaign as viewed by 20 participants. Without their coopera-
tion, it could not have been written.
It is hoped that papers such as this one, in
combination, may add to our knowledge about how individual
citizens working together try to influence politics in
America.
(1)Indianapolis News, May 15, 1968, p. 20 - McCarthy
received only 19% of the vote in Indianapolis; 29%
statewide.
Chapter One
The McCarthy effort in Indiana was an outgrowth
of previous local organizations in the state. Unlike the
Kennedy effort, it could have been described as "grass-
roots," at least in some respects. In order to explain its
development, it is therefore necessary to look closely at
the groups responsible for I-1cCarthy's entry into the
Indiana primary.
A national campaign called "Negotiations Now"
reached Indianapolis and many other parts of the state.
This was the first peace-oriented effort, one which could
be termed "moderate" in its politics and approach. Hore
radical organizations, with limited followings -- such
as the Fellovlship of Reconciliation, a pacifist group, and
the vlomen's International League for Peace and Freedom, a
women's peace group -- had already been in existence in
Indianapolis for the previous six to seven years. (1)
However, in the fall of 1966 Hoosiers for Peace,
the Indiana arm of Negotiations Now, was formed. The new
group was a closely-knit, state-wide organization which set
an initial gqal of collecting signatures on petitions pro-
vided by national Negotiations Now. The only decision-
making body of the organization was a state-wide steering
committee which one joined by invitation. Originally this
committee had twenty-two members, but this number expanded as
time went on. The members voted on whether or not to invite
2particular persons to join; a few were rejected, usually
on the ground that they were too radical. Hoosiers for
Peace feared that any radical tinge might impair their
ability to reach out into the conservative Indiana
community. (2) This group's leadership in Indianapolis came
largely from the Department of Social Concerns of the
Disciples of Christ. (3) Though their success was largely
on the campuses, they were able to involve a couple of
prominent businessmen.
The organization's overall goal was to communicate
to the business and "liberal" communities an awareness of
the need for opposition to the war in Vietnam. (4) Negotia-
tions Now petitions were circulated primarily on college
campuses, among faculty members, and in the religious and
peace communities. They were circulated by individuals who
already knew each other through their work, organizational
activity, or on a social basis. Though petitions were passed
out at various political meetings, a door-to-door effort was
never organized. Of 6,000 signatures collected, 2,000 were
those of professors. (5)
In late November of 1967, Hoosiers for Peace
sponsored a speech by Senator Vance Hartke in Indianapolis. (6)
The size of the audience -- at least 800 persons -- and its
obvious enthusiasm had an exhilarating effect upon many who
were present. This was an important meeting, in that it
convinced many individuals that a "peace campaign" might in
3fact be launched in the Democratic primary in Indiana. (7)
As things turned out, the Hartke meeting was the last
major effort organized by Hoosiers for Peace. While
petitions calling for immediate negotiations in vietnam
were circulating across the country, an idea for a new
organizational tactic had begun to develop.
In the late summer and early fall of 1967 a group
called "National Dissenting Democrats" had formed -- a
group which spoke of organizing opposition to Lyndon
Johnson's renomination as the Democratic party's candidate
for president of the united States. (8) A founding member
of this group, Curtis Ganz, of Washington, D. C., had met
Robert Fangmeir of Indianapolis at a national planning
session of Negotiations Now. In the fall of 1967, Ganz
had started to work for Dissenting Democrats. In October
he contacted Fangmeir and asked for names of those who
might be willing to attend a meeting in Indianapolis to
discuss the possibility of opposing President Johnson in
the Indiana primary. (9)
At this initial meeting, ideas were exchanged and
Hartke's possible candidacy considered, but no local
organization was formed. In addition to setting up this
meeting, Ganz remained in Indiana?olis for a few days to
speak with certain individuals, one of whom was attorney
Don Fasig. (11) While advising against a challenge to
Johnson in Indiana, (12) Fasig suggested Ganz contact the
4Reverend James Armstrong (13) and attorney Sig Beck,(14)
two persons he knew who might be sympathetic, and who
were also close to James Beatty, chairman of the Democratic
Party in Marion county. (15) Ganz spoke informally with
both these men. (16)
In mid-November, "a small group of political
science professors, clergymen, and disaffected Democrats
unhappy with the administration's Vietnam policy" gathered
to form an organization which "as yet had no name." (17)
Their first meeting was in the basement of the Merchants
National Bank and Trust Company located at the corner of
38th Street and Washington Boulevard in Indianapolis. The
Reverend James Armstrong convened this meeting, and among
thosepresent were: Harvey Lord, dean of students at
Christian Theological Seminary; Don Fasig; James Beatty;
Dr. Frank Lloyd, a Marion County Democratic ward chairman
and one of the city's most prominent Negroes; James Bogle,
professor at Notre Dame; Robert Toal, professor at Purdue;
James Dinsmoor, an Indiana University professor and former
"peace candidate" in the 1966 Seventh District Democratic
Congressional primary; Robert Fangmeir; Vern Rossman; and
Dallas Sells, state president of the AFL-CIO. (18)
The main speaker of the evening was Allard
Lowenstein, a professional organizer from national Dissenting
Democrats, who had come to discuss the aims of his organiza-
tion. The discussion centered around several important
5.
questions: Could the nomination of President Johnson be
realistically opposed? Could those who challenged him
expect support in Indiana? Could they even find a candidate
in Indiana? (19) Those present agreed to form an organiza-
tion, and, as soon as possible, to approach Senator Hartke
to sound out his availability as a candidate in the state
primary. James Bogle was selected as chairman, since he
was willing to take a leave of absence from Notre Dame and
devote his full-time efforts to organizing the new group.
His first job was to organize a contingent from Indiana to
go to the Conference of Concerned Democrats in Chicago,
December 3 and 4. (20) James Armstrong was selected as
vice-chairman, and Robert Fangmeir, treasurer.
The "professionals" at the meeting would not return
to the anti-Johnson effort again until the formation of
still another group called "Citizens for HcCarthy, ",which
was organized following McCarthy's surprise showing in the
New Hampshire primary. (21) Professors and churchmen, some
of whom had been among the leade~s of Hoosiers for Peace,
formed the core of this newest g~oup in November, 1967.
When the Conference of Concerned Democrats (as
Dissenting Democrats now called itself) convened in Chicago
at the end of November, among those attending from
Indianapolis were Lord, Fangmeir, Toal, Bogle and Rossman.
This proved to be a significant meeting, first because
6McCarthy acknowledged his avail~ility as a candidate, and
second, because the Indiana delegation caucused and decided
to form their own organization, rather than affiliate with
Concerned Democrats. There were two reasons for forming
Hoosiers for a Democratic Alternative -- hereafter referred
to as HDA. Hartke rather than McCarthy was their first
choice for a candidate; and they believed Indiana provincial-
ism called for an indigenous organization within the state. (22)
The goal of HDA would be to provide a base of power
sufficiently convincing to persuade either Hartke or McCarthy
to run in the Indiana primary. (23)
Footnotes for Chapter One
(1) WILPF was an organization of approximately 50 to 60
with a mailing of 200, FOR an organization of
approximately 25 with a mailing of 100. These figures
are for Indianapolis only. WILPF also had state
branches in Bloomington, Terre Haute and Lafayette.
(2) Sue Craig, interview, August 29, 1968, at her horne in
Indianapolis. Mrs. Craig v:as a former member of the
steering committee of HOOSlers for Peace, former
president of the Indianapolis chapter of WILPF.
(3) Vern Rossman and his wife Dee were among the founders
of the group and considered by many the backbone of
the group, also Barton Hunt the chairman, Robert
Fangmeir, the treasurer, were all from the Department
of Social Concerns. They also had the sympathetic
support of such individuals in their department as
A. Garnett Day whom they could count upon.
(4) Craig interview, Russell Heritage and Charles Argast,
both prominent businessmen, did quite a bit of public
speaking on their behalf.
(5) Dee Rossman interview, July 16, 1968, at her horne in
Indianapolis. Mrs. Rossman vas a former steering
committee member of both Hoosiers for Peace and Hoosiers
for a Democratic Alternative and a part-time staff
person for Hoosiers for a Democratic Alternative.
(6) This meeting was organized by Dee Rossman.
(7) Robert Fangmeir interview, June 15, 1969 at his office
in Indianapolis. Mr. Fangmeir was a member of the
steering committee and treasurer of both Hoosiers for
Peace and Hoosiers for a Democratic Alternative. He
also reported that he felt that prior to this meeting
most of the people there had assumed themselves as an
infitesimal minority in their opposition to the war.
(8) "The Dump Johnson Movement," Commonweal, LXXXVII
(October 27, 1967), p. 106.
(9) Fangmeir interview.
(10) Rossman interview.
(11) Don Fasig is a former ward c~airman in Indianapolis,
a lawyer, former assistant prosecutor for the city of
Indianapolis, and a political ally of the county
chairman, James L. Beatty.
(12) Don Fasig interview, July 23, 1969, at his law office
in Indianapolis.
(13) Rev. James Armstrong was the pastor of the Broadway
Methodist Church. He was Jarnes Beatty's minister,
friend and political ally. He had been involved in
politics in Indianapolis for some time.
(14) Sig Beck is a prominent lawyer in Indianapolis. He
was one of the founders of Nan-partisans for Better
Schools, a liberal group which has succeeded in
electing two members to the lndianapolis School
Board. He is also a close ally of James Beatty.
(15) James Beatty had been the Democratic County Chairman
in Marion County for over three years. He ran for
mayor in the 1967 Democratic primary against his own
incumbent mayor, whom he felt to be too conservative
and a tool of the conservative faction of the party.
He was opposed as county chairman by Governor Roger
Branigin and other state leaders. He lost the first
battl~ and won the second.
(16) Indianapolis~, November ]7, 1967, p. 20.
(17) Ibid, p. 20.
(18) Rossman, Fasig and Fangmeir, interviews helped compile
this list.
(19) Harvey Lord interview, June ]6, 1969, at his office
in Indianapolis. Mr. Lord was on the steering
committee of HOosiers for a Democratic Alternative
and was the organizer of their convention.
..,..
!
(20) James Bogle interview February 13, 1970 in Indiana-
polis. Mr. Bogle was invited to the meeting by
Lowenstein, who he knew through Americans for
Democratic Action (ADA).
(21) Lord interview. Fasig remained somewhat involved
though his name wasn't used. Some never returned
Sells, Dr. Lloyd and others.
(22) Ibid.
(23) Bogle interview.
7Chapter Two
By January of 1968 Hoosiers for a Democratic
Alternative was a functioning group. Its minimal staff
consisted of James Bogle, chairman and organizer and Dee
Rossman, who was hired part-time t.o (1) get mailings to
Democrats acrosS the state, and (2) organize a convention
and dinner in March. (1) HDA' s immediate goals were to
find a candidate and to expand its base sufficiently to
encourage that candidate to run. (2)
At this early stage HDA had some important assets:
A mailing list of 6,000 names taken from the "Negotiations
Now" petitions, and a very dedicated if sornewhat; inexperienced
group of leaders. Its major liability was that it was
excl usi vely an educated, white, middle··class group with a
strong tinge of do-goodism. There was no representation and
no real commitment from the black community, poor whites,
labor, businessmen or professionals (lawyers, doctors,
accountants, etc.). (3) There were few students initially
involved in the group. And HDA was v.i.ewed askance by many
people in general sympathy with their stated aims. (4)
When HDA began to function, it appeared as though
everything was going "well." Bogle traveled around the
state setting up new chapters of EDAi on January 17, he
told the Indianapolis Star that HDA had "2,000 members in
52 Indiana comrnunities.,,(5) Soon the organization was
8placed on a membership basis, with dues of five dollars.
Dee Rossman put the 6,000 "Negotiations Now" names on cards
and began to classifY individuals according to the work they
might do. (6) A budget of $40,000 was drawn up which proposed
to pay for billboard advertisements, TV time, and the opera-
tion of a first-class political organization (which would
be, hopefully, somewhat competitive with the regular
Democratic Party) .(7) A fund raising and recruitment mailing
was sent to the 6,000 individuals named on the peti tions.
All of these activities were to culminate at the dinner and
convention in March.
The plans and even the press releases went far
beyond reality. HDA chapters with large memberships actually
existed in only three communities, the university towns of
Bloomington, Lafayette and South Bend. (8) Though Bogle spoke
with numerous individuals and small groups, he was often
unable to follow through, once such contacts had been made. (9)
Dee Rossman received four or five new names to add to her
list, but often they lacked the necessary addresses. Bogle
was seeing many people, but not keeping good notes on his
travels. By March, HDA was claiming 60 local chapters, but
this figure was a myth. (10)
In Indianapolis there was substantial work done
among faculty members of the various universities, (11) but
altogether, many people were missed. No large meeting was
ever held in order to discover who might be interested and
willing to volunteer their services. In Indianapolis, HDA
remained the steering committee. "People were ready to go,
9but they were told that HDA was still planning.~(12)
However much planning HDA may have been doing, it still
did not have a candidate. Hartke had given no answer to
earlier inquiries. Finally, in desperation, Bogle,
Armstrong and Fasig(13) flew to Washington to confer with
Hartke. At this meeting it was made clear that Hartke
would not run. His staff promised, however, to raise
some money for the group. (14) McCarthy was now the man
HDA would have to convince to run in Indiana.
The lack of experience of the HDA people was
also slowing the progress. Even the group's membership
cards had become a problem and a source of delay. The
original cards did not have a union label on them, a fact
which Pat Welch, the County Chairman's secretary, caught
immediately. And the cards had no perforated part which
could be kept for records. They had to be reprinted.
Though 100,000 envelopes had been ordered for a mailing,
only 10,000 were ever used. "The other names just never
materialized because no one had the lists that everyone
talked about." (15)
March 28 was the filing date for petitions
requesting that a candidate's name be placed on an Indiana
primary ballot. At a meeting on February 29 it was reported
that there were no petitions printed, (16) since there was
disagreement about the necessity of preparing petitions
"this early." Dee Rossman went ahead on her own and had them
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printed; later, she picked up the petitions only to
find that HDA could not pay the $70 bill. Next, it was
discovered that the petitions had not been printed in
compliance with Indiana law. (17) By the !1arch 5 steering
committee meeting, the petitions were finally ready. This
delay and lack of organization almost kept Senator McCarthy
off the ballot in Indiana. (18)
The original proposal of a $40,000 budget turned
out to be an unrealistic goal. In its report to the
Indiana Secretary of State, HDA announced a total expendi-
ture of $14,804.18. Though most Df this money was collected
for HDA, much of it came in late in the r.1cCarthycampaign,
and was transferred to Citizens f~r McCarthy. (19) There
seem to have been some differences in vision concerning
HDA's financial needs. On the one hand, people talked in
terms of a $40,000 budget; and on the other, the HDA
treasurer stated that no unusual amounts of time and energy
were spent fundraising, since HDA was "not a large
financial operation. II Although the latter turned out to
be the case, it certainly was not what many had envisioned.
In fact, simply finding enough money to keep Bogle going
turned out to be one of HDA's most crucial problems. (20)
What money HDA did collect, came in the way of
small contributions in response to mailings (usually five
to ten dollars), although there ~ere a few $100 contribu-
tions. The largest sums came from the active chapters.
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One $800 donation, for example, was received from the
Bloomington chapter. (21)
Plans for the March dinner were also hampered by
a lack of funds. Because the organizers could not afford
any advertisements, "the entire job had to be done by
telephone." (22) According to Pat Welch, one of the main
organizers of the dinner, all that one could do was to
call those individuals who might be sympathetic.
During the month of March attention focused on
Senator McCarthy. He had to be convinced to run in
Indiana. Bogle was frequently in Washington, and his
attitude was "Go, go, we can do it in Indiana." He con-
veyed this attitude to staffers in Washington and in
Indiana. (23) In Washington, McCarthy's national head-
quarters was informed that HDA had 8,000 to 10,000
members. (24) Bogle also found good use for the results
of a telephone poll conductedm Indiana. The poll found
McCarthy with about fifty per cent of the vote in a race
against Branigin; and it predicted approximately the
same showing against Johnson. The figures with regard to
Branigin particularly impressed McCarthy. (25)
It would therefore appear that Bogle played an
important role in getting McCarthy to come to the state;
he has been criticized for this. (26)
While admitting that his expectations may have
been exaggerated, Bogle answers such criticism by noting
that at the time the telephone po Il:was taken, Johnson had
not dropped out of the race nor had Kennedy entered. He
12
claims that his projections would not have been unrealistic
had McCarthy's sole oppositbn beer. Branigin, acting as a
legitimate stand-in for Johnson. (27)
Then came Tuesday, March 12, election day in New
Hampshire. The results there had quite an effect in Indiana
as well as across the nation. Though it was already fairly
certain that McCarthy would run in Indiana, this clenched
it, and on March 15 the Indianapolis Star made the official
announcement: "McCarthy to enter Indiana primary. II (28)
People now began to rally to the cause. On the
Monday prior to the New Hampshire primary only 185 tickets
had been sold for the HDA dinner the following Saturday
where McCarthy was to speak (an astoundingly low number,
considering that McCarthy thought at the time the HDA had
a membership of from 8,000 to 10,000). There were 575 in
attendance at the dinner on Saturday night, and many had to
be turned away. (29)
At the same time ticket sales were booming, the pro-
fessional politicians, already sonewhat sympathetic with
McCarthy's aims, were at work. That week a meeting was held
in Indianapolis at the Broadway Christian Center. It was
attended by James Beatty, former Marion County Democratic
chairman Judson Haggerty, a number of Negroes, and many
prominent Indianapolis liberals. Those present discussed
new organizational forms, and considered the possibility of
hiring a professional campaign coordinator. (30) The meeting
represented the potential of a powerful coalition in Indiana-
polis behind McCarthy.
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The ]\iinnesotaSenator's moral victory in New
Hampshire also had its effect on the HDA convention for
which final plans were made during the week of Harch 11.
The convention would begin Friday night, prior to the
dinner, and would extend all day Saturday. The idea of
the convention was to provide political education for the
participants from allover the state, and to establish an
organizational structure. (31) There were to be workshops
on various urgent problems; these groups would report to
a plenary session, which would then pass resolutions and
take action(32) - a fairly typical procedure for political
conferences and conventions.
However, the night before the convention, HDA's
state steering committee spent the entire evening debating
whether or not to call off the entire affair. The Indiana
Democratic Party's state committee was also meeting that
weekend in French Lick. Now that ]\1cCarthyhad won in New
Hampshire, some people felt that HDA's presence at the
party's meeting was more important than the convention.
Harvey Lord, the coordinator of the convention, who had
spent weeks putting it together, however, refused to cancel
the convention. (33)
It was decided that the convention would go on, but
HDA leaders chartered a plane and flew to French Lick. Once
in French Lick, Armstrong and Bogle addressed the county
chairmen. They proposed four alternatives to the war:
"(1) Stop the bombing of the North; (2) deescalate in the
14
South without withdrawal; (3) promote free elections, and
(4) involve the United Nations. II (34) Those who went to
French Lick on McCarthy's behalf all pledged to support the
Democratic nominee, whoever he might be, though they were
known McCarthy supporters. There was no action taken upon
their suggestions.
Meanwhile, back in Indianapolis, with only a few
hours until convention time, Harvey Lord was busy finding
secondary people to run the workshops. (35) With the
leadership in French Lick there was no one to meet ~'1cCarthy
at the airport, although a student rally and press conference
were planned to accompany his arrival, McCarthy reached
Indianapolis over an hour later than expected, however, with
police escort, he was given a hero's welcome by the many
students who were willing to wait in order to see the man
who had done, what many of their parents had claimed was
impossible. (36)
The dinner that night was a turning point for the
leadership of what had now officially become the McCarthy
campaign in Indiana. Many of those active in HDA would now
playa much less prominent role in the campaign organization.
HDA had begun with plans for the dinner and, with the excep-
tion of getting the petitions collected for placing McCarthy's
name on the ballot, it ended w.i, th the dinner.
Senator McCarthy was now considered a viable candi-
date by many prominent Indianapolis liberals. Leo Zeckler(37)
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and .Merle Miller(38) approached Al Edelson(39) that night
and suggested that, as individuals "with large financial con-
tacts" they should get together and help. (40)
HDA had brought McCarthy to Indiana, but it was
neither ready or able to run the campaign. Though its
organizations in Bloomington, South Bend and Lafayette were
to continue to run their own showsr elsewhere, other
organizations took over.
However, it is an interesting and perhaps even
significant footnote to such developments that HDA, in
altered form, still exists today. The leadership of the
New Democratic Coalition, with Robert Toal of Lafayette as
its chairman, is by and large the old HDA grouping, with
some new people picked up as a result of the McCarthy
campaign.
(1)
(2 )
( 3)
(4 )
(10)
(11)
Footnotes to Chapter Two
Rossman interview.
Bogle interview.
Rossman and Lord interviews.
Herle Miller interview, July 20, 1969 in Indianapolis.
Mr. Miller who was chairman of Citizens for t-1cCarthy,
expressed the view that lithe¥,were third party peoplell
and that he would never get 1nvolved with that dead-
end approach. Al Edelson,interview, August 16, 1968
expressed a similar react10ni he too was active in
Citizens for McCarthy. Pat Welch interview, July 25,
1968. She said that at Thursday luncheons (the weekly
meeting of the Beattyi~es), she V;as "looked at askance"
for being involved. IJI1S~We~ch 1S the secretary to
James Beatty and was act1ve 1n HDA.
(5)
(6 )
(7)
Indianapolis ~, January 17, 1968, p. 25.
D. Rossman interview.
Bogle and Rossman interviews~ Bogle in his interview
commented that the $40,000 f1gure was unrealistic,
both in terms of what was needed (they needed much
more) and in terms of what they could raise (much less).
(8)
(9 )
Lord interview.
This seemed to have been due to three factors: lack of
time, money and, to some extent, organizational under-
standing, at least with regard to what commitments such
as "I'll see what I can get goingll means. In every
interview I have had, if Bogle's name came up, he was
reported lacking in his ability to organize things on
a day-to-day basis.
Rossman and Lord interviews. Both said that Bogle
overstated their strength considerably. According
to Rossman, there were twenty-five groups at the
most, many of which were not viable. The sixty at
best represented the number of groups Bogle addressed.
Lord interview. A faculty group was formed in
Indianapolis. They got together 100 names for an
ad, spoke at teas arranged by housewives, and
sponsored one meeting where Andrew Jacobs of the
11th District spoke.
(12 )
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18 )
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24 )
(25 )
(26)
Craig interview. In addition to these comments, Sue
added that she was never at any time invited to a
meeting, and that the only task that she could obtain
was that of selling tickets to the dinner. She had '
been president of the WILPF in Indianapolis for four
years, and had also been on the steering committee of
Hoosiers for Peace, and served as a Democratic
precinct vice-committeeman.
Fasig in his interview said tha.t he worked with Bogle
and Armstrong early. He was to be their liaison with
the Democratic Party regulars. It had been agreed by
his friends in the party that he should pay this role.
However, he did not want to surface at this early date
because of how it might reflect upon his political
allies within the party.
Fasig and Bogle interviews.
Rossman interview.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Fangmeir interview. Mr. Fangmeir had the financial
report in his office at the time of the interview.
Fasig interview.
Fangmeir interview.
Welch interview.
Fasig interview. Fasig actually went so far as to say
lIifhe (Bogle) hadn't lied to the national about our
strength they probably never would have come to
Indiana.~ However, Fasig went on to say that the
McCarthy campaign t';1rt;-edout to b~ <;'t "real shot in ~he
arm" to Indiana POlltlCS. In addltlon he was surprlsed
at how poorly Brangin did in the primary.
Herzog.
Bogle interview.
Those who felt that McCarthy should not have entered
th primary were quite critical and seemed to feel
th:t he might not have entered had he been given a
more accurate report about the strength of HDA.
These people included Don Fasig, Sylvia Zazas
and Arthur Herzog in his recent book, McCarthy
for President.
(27) Bogle interview.
(28) Indianapolis Star, March 15, 1968, p. 1.
(29) Welch interview.
(30) Bogle interview. Bogle saw this as an attempt of
Indianapolis people to take over the campaign.
(31) Lord interview.
(32) Ibid. - An 18 page platform dealing with such topics
~International Consequences of the War," "Loss of
Hope for Democracy Abroad," "Our Cities," "Business
and Finance," and others was produced by the convention.
(33) Ibid. Harvey Lord and Dee Rossman are the two best
examples of this.
(34) Indianapolis Star, March 17, 1968, p. 8.
(35) Lord interview.
(36) Ibid.
(37) Lew Zeckler is an architect and builder in Indianapolis.
(38) Merle Hiller is a name partner in the largest law firm
in Indianapolis, long a prominent Democrat.
(39) Al Edelson is a businessman and longtime Democrat
in Indianapolis.
(40) Al Edelson interview, August 15, 1968 in Indianapolis.
(41) Ibid.
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Chapter Three
Senator McCarthy's "children's crusadell came to
Indiana to face a situation considerably different from
those in New Hampshire and Wisconsin. The challenge in
Indiana proved to be far more complex, resembling a more
typical campaign, with real opponents (two now), fighting
it out more on the basis of style and personality than on
issues.
When the New York Times analyzed McCarthy's
victory in New Hampshire, it found a number of factors had
contributed to his success. Firstr anti-Vietnam war feeling
had been intensified by the success of the Tet offensive
waged by the Viet Cong in late January of 1968. Second,
voters were considerably antagonized by the newly-enacted
surtax. Third, McCarthy's student volunteers, who went
door to door through the cold, were able to convey their : -"
deep convictions about the war to the people. Fourth, the "i.f,
McCarthy forces had better voter lists to work with than did
.j I..•
the regular Democrats supporting the president. Robert Craig
of the University of New Hampshire had turned over to the
McCarthy students a recent study of the New Hampshire voters.
Host important, however, according to the "Times" was the
dislike of Johnson. He was viewed by the public as a
"wheeler dealer" who failed to give the whole truth; in
contrast, New Hampshire voters believed "Senator McCarthy gave
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it to them straight. II (1) A Louis Harris poll supported
this conclusion. Harris found that if Vietnam had been the
central issue in the minds of the voters, McCarthy would
have received twenty-two per cent of the vote rather than
forty-two per cent. (2)
These factors were greatly altered by the time of
the Indiana primary. For two reasons, the war could no
longer be considered the major campaign issue. First,
President Johnson had announced that he would seek negotiations
with the North Vietnamese, and that peace talks would begin
as soon as possible. (3) Second, with the entrance of Robert
Kennedy into the primary, there were two candidates who could
be considered "anti-war."
Furthermore, the appeal of student workers would be
less valuable in Indiana, since there would now be two real
crews of students out canvassing. In addition, Hoosiers
:;,)
'~j"
-;1
~ .::
~
I:~ .1
..'
W
.,'
- ,]-
proved to be less receptive to the idea of "out-of-state"
students talking to them about their politics and their vote. (4)
And so far as voters' lists went, the McCarthy people in
Indiana had very poor lists to work with, if they had them at
all. (5)
As it turned out, the "most important factor" was
eliminated when Lyndon Baines Johnson withdrew his name from
consideration as a prospective candidate for reelection.
There was no longer the promise of a "David and Goliath"
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clash. The night Johnson withdrew, McCarthy is reported to
have said, "I feel as if I've been tracking a tiger through
long jungle grass and all of a sudden he rolls over and he's
stuffed." (6) The entire theme of the campaign had to be
changed now and. all the materials rewritten. This slowed the
first few weeks of the Indiana campaign considerably, because
while the national staff had no new materials (leaflets, T.V.
spots, etc.), at the same time they would not allow local
groups to put out their own advertising for fear of conflicts
of issues. (7) According to a number of sources, it was not
until Oregon that the McCarthy forces were able to hit their
stride again. (8)
It was the day of the Hoosiers for a Democratic
Alternative dinner for McCarthy, March 16, that first Senator
Kennedy and then Governor Branigin announced that they would
also run in the Indiana primary. Both of these men had .~ I
large, well-oiled organizations behind them. Branigin
commanded a truly formidable organization, since Indiana is
a patronage state, and the man in the statehouse controls
approximately 23,000 jobs. (9) Only one county chairman in
the state refused to endorse the governor, and that was James
Beatty in Marion County, who never endorsed any candidate.
Otherwise, Branigin was reportedly very popular throughout
Indiana. (10) In addition, it was anticipated that the
governor's conservative approach would suit the political
climate in Indiana. The New York Times analyzed the voters
as follows:
19
A large majority of the one million-odd
Democrats in this state tend to fall in
one or more categories: organization-
oriented, conservative, hcwkish on Vietnam,
Southern in outlook rural or resentful of
Negro social and political advances. (11)
Branigin was further favored by the support of the Indianapolis
?tar and the Indianapolis ~, the two largest newspapers in
Jhdiana.
The Kennedy organization was also impressive. It
featured "50 professionals and 2,000 volunteers,,,(l2) and
most of the professionals were seasoned workers. (13) One
McCarthy supporter put it this ",'lay:"Everything about the
Kennedy headquarters seemed efficient and well-planned; they
had banks of phones manned by self-assured young people. When
we managed to put up one poster in a neighborhood, it would
immediately be covered with Kennedy posters, while a sound
truck broadcasting Bobby's name went merilly by."(14)
The McCarthy organization came into Indiana in . :;;
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trouble. The New Hampshire campaign had been well financed,
with at least $200,000 spent on television and radio time.
It was expected that the Kennedy effort would now tap many of
McCarthy's financial sources. ~he McCarthy contingent arrived
without a finance chairman, although it was to have numerous
individuals in that position during the Indiana campaign. (15)
Perhaps most important, the McCarthy staff and
strategy were in flux. The senator's most talented staff
coordinators, Richard Goodwin and Allard Lowenstein, had
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already left to work for Senator Kennedy. In vJisconsin
there were staff disaffections, including the resignations
of press secretary, Seymour Hersh and chief assistant, Mary
Lou Oates, over disagreements about the best campaign
stra~egy. (16) Also some of McCarthy's best assistants
returned to school after the Wisconsin primary. (17) As top
staff men, he was left with a couple of Minnesota colleagues,
a shoe manufacturer, a Wall Street financier, a television
producer and a former public relations man for the Americans
for Democratic Action. "Theodore White's books were about
as close as any of them had ever come to a national campaign,"
wrote Steven Roberts. (18) The new situation required a
reassessment of strategy. However, according to Jeremy Larner,
no such reevaluation was forthcoming. Larner commented on
the staff and strategy after Wisconsin: "The men who occupied
the key position on the national staff were nervous because
there was no campaign strategy. There were non-meetings
with McCarthy where he would nod his head and say nothing to
every specific proposal. Finally he would say that we would
go on pretty much as before, but how was that? . Goodwin
had been the one person who could hafway hold things together
and he was leaving now. . . •II (19)
Among McCarthy's Indiana supporters there was less
enthusiasm now that Johnson was out and Kennedy in. In
Indianapolis, Merle Miller, the chairman of Citizens for
McCarthy, was not sure whether he should remain involved now
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that the president had removed his name from the race.
Miller believed McCarthy had achieved his original goal. (20)
Miller did, however, remain as chairman of Citizens for
McCarthy. Others were tempted to defect to Senator Kennedy;
their original ardour had cooled. Don Fasig remained active
in the McCarthy ca~mpaign because he had made a commitment,
and felt the reliability of his political reputation required
that he stay. Fasig stated that there were many others who
stayed for basically the same reason, even after Kennedy's
entrance. (21) Armstrong, who had been one of the earliest
organizers of the HcCarthy effort, became less active. (22)
The coalition of people who met at the Broadway Center just
after McCarthy's victory in New Hampshire never met again.
Many of those individuals joined the Kennedy camp. Even
some of those who remained officially vii thin the McCarthy
Camp were suspected of being Kennedy spies within the
organization. (23)
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Chapter Four
THE INDIANA CAMPAIGN IS LAUNCHED
McCarthy's campaign was officially launched in Indiana
that night of March 16 when he spoke at the HDA dinner in
Indianapolis. As it turned out, the occasion marked the
beginning of a two-week period of confusion. Many felt it
was time for new local leaders to take charge, but exactly
who they would be, and what functions they would have, was
unclear. A national staff made up of "professional" workers
would soon be coming to town; everyone awaited their ideas
and direction, but they were latem coming, and when they
arrived they were often confused themselves.
Citizens for McCarthy, which had been conceived the
night of the dinner, had yet to be formed. Armstrong, who
had been quite active in HDA, was convinced that the campaign
needed a new type of local leadership at this point. (1) He
believed it was necessary to attract people with previous
political experience and individuals with contacts among
the more wealthy and powerful Indianapolis citizens.
Armstrong and a new recruit to the cause, Al Edelson, called
friends, both political and personal, whom they knew to be
sympathetic to their aims. They arranged a meeting at the
Edelson home on March 22. (2) Invited were E. Kirk McKinney,
Thomas M. Scanlon,(3) Irving Fink,(4) Pat Ulen,(S) Sylvia
Zazas, (6) Sigmund Beck, (7) Don Fasig, Mrs. Winifred Smith(8)
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Alexander Moore(9) and others. It was clearly an
Indianapolis-dominated committee.
At this first meeting of Citizens for HcCarthy, few
of the groups functions were clearly defined. First, the
members agreed to provide a local letterhead from which to
operate. Second, they would initiate a local fund-raising
drive for McCarthy's Indiana effort. (10) They also decided
upon some officers. Merle Miller would be the chairman
although he was in Florida at the time and did not know until
several days later that he had been "nominated" chairman; (11)
E. Kirk McKinney agreed to serve as treasurer if this would
be his sole responsibility during the campaign; and Tom
Scanlon was placed in charge of fund raising. It was also
decided that any other projects the group might undertake
should be coordinated with the McCarthy national organiza-
tion, which was unrepresented at the meeting at Edelsons.
As Edelson was to remark later, the difficulty with such a
group was that it may well have represented money, power,
and experience in the community, but that signing one's
name to a letterhead doesn't necessarily mean work. (12)
Meanwhile, what was to be the role of HDA? Many
people who had put in long hours of work for that organiza-
tion were asking this question. (13) Armstrong's initial
idea was that citizens for McCarthy would be the fund-
raising group, and that HDA would continue to function as
the "community liaison.,,(14) However, representatives of
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the two groups never met to work this out, and it remained
nothing more than an idea. As the official fund raiser
with an impressive letterhead, Citizens for McCarthy
emerged as the dominant orgnization in Indianapolis. (15)
This meant that a number of people in HDA were never to
be in leadership positions again in the McCarthy effort,
and this created a certain amount of resentment. (16)
One person who did manage to survive the shift
between organizations was Bogle, but the manner in which
he made such a transition was not vi,thout its complications.
Armstrong wanted to find a professional person in the state
to run the campaign for Citizens for McCarthy; (17) Bogle
wanted to retain leadership 6f the Indiana movement, and
he made his availability generally known. Even though
Armstrong wanted a more professional manager, he did not
have a person ready to take the job. Finally, on March 31,
the night of President Johnson's withdrawal, the Citizens
for McCarthy people met with Bogle and Toal, (18) and Bogle
was made "campaign manager.,,(19) The next day Merle Miller
returned from Florida to discover that he was chairman of
Citizens for McCarthy, and that a press conference was
scheduled for 2 P. H. that day. (20) The announcement made
to the press was that the "new organization would run the
whole Indiana operation." (21) It was never really clear
how much responsibility the Citizens for McCarthy group and
Bogle did, in fact, have.
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An interim headquarters was set up at the Essex
House prior to the arrival of workers from the national
organization. Don Fasig was in charge of this project.
Initially, things were chaotic. (22) No one had expected
that the entire national McCarthy staff slated to work in
Indiana would be housed in Indianapolis. More satisfactory
headquarters were needed, but no one seemed to know where
to look. Pat Welch and James Armstrong approached Sylvia
Zazas and asked her to do the job. Mrs. Zazas cites this
assignment as an example of how totally unprepared she was
for the magnitude of the campaign. (23) Neither she nor
anyone else had been given any indication at that time of
what the staff's needs would be; by the time she found out,
it was too late. She rented the Old Tavern Room of the
Claypool Hotel, thinking she had found a sufficiently
spacious place, only to discover that it was only about
one-sixth as large as what would be needed as a base of
operations for the Indiana staff. (24) Luckily, the
incoming McCarthy people had connections in Texas which
got them the entire second floor of the Claypool Hotel for
office space. However, the hotel was closed to guests
because of a recent fire, and could not put up their staff.
There were thirty new people to house for the
entire campaign. By the time Mrs. Zazas was given the
specific assignment, the Branigin staff had reserved all
the extra rooms in the Sheraton-Lincoln, and the Kennedy
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forces were in control of the other two major hotels in
town, the Marott and Stouffer's Inn. (25) Finally, after
much negotiating, the Warren Hotel was offered, but it
was subsequently turned down by McCarthy's staff. (26)
As a result, the workers had to be scattered in various
places, although space was obtained in the Marott for the
national headquarters. (27)
The entire operation in Indianapolis kept waiting
for word from McCarthy leaders who were concentrating all
their efforts in Wisconsin. The Indiana supporters felt
in limbo, fearful to make arrangements without the approval
of the national staff, and yet panicky about the passage of
valuable time. For example, a statewide meeting of students
was held during this period, but it proved inconclusive
because no one knew what the national workers would do when
they arrived. (28) No one with any authority was sent nor
were instructions forthcoming. (29) Finally, in desperation,
Kirk MCKinney, Don Fasig and Ted Pollack(30) chartered a
plane to Milwaukee. They talked to .HcCarthy staff people
and explained that they had to know the national organiza-
tion's plans if they were to set up any sort of apparatus
within which the national staff could function in Indiana -
but there were no plans to transmit. (31) Meanwhile, every-
one waited, "ready to gJ.ve themselves over to the pros. II (32)
At the close of the Wisconsin primary, they came.
But they did not bring with them the expertise and precision
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that had been anticipated. First, they were very young;
a local participant later commented that one of the national
staffers they had awaited so eagerly subsequently became
a freshman at Bloomington. (33) Secondly, there were no
clear lines of authority. Harvey Lord had already ordered
bumper stickers made and when the national McCarthy staff
arrived, they wanted the stickers. Lord asked for the
money first, or at least a commitment from someone in
charge of finances. No one seemed to know who that would
be. There was no one with the authority to purchase bumper
stickers! What Lord did not know was. that as soon as the
national staff arrived, a dispute arose over who would
control the finances. Ultimately, Curt Ganz had to fly to
Washington to speak with McCarthy in order to settle the
matter. (34) Many of the staffers had nebulous authority in
other areas as well, a fact explored in more detail in chapter
five.
The Indianapolis people found that in this early
period they were giving advice rather than receiving
direction. Edelson reported that they received "eleven calls
a day wanting advice that ranged from where to buy staples
to 'Will you call a financial meeting?,"(35) There was no
direction at all with regard to t.h o news media. Bogle
complained that even though local workers had built up
considerable public interest and momentum with frequent
28
press conferences and neWS stories, once the national
staff arrived "there wasn't a statement issued to the
h lf ,,(36)press for a week and a a .
There are a number of theories about why many
workers of the national McCarthy staff seemed to be so
confused(37) during this early period. Whatever the
reasons, the confusion had a demoralizing effect on certain
crucial Indiana people, and it seemed to set the tone for
the McCarthy campaign in Indianapolis if not elsewhere.
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Chapter Five
SETTING UP THE ORGANIZATION
From the beginning, the organization of McCarthy
campaign in Indiana was divided into departments, each
headed by a permanent staff worker and a local counter-
part. (1) The departments were press relations, finance,
office management, labor, farmers and students. The state
itself was divided into eleven areas which roughly corres-
ponded to the eleven congressional districts. Activities
in each of these areas were coordinated by a nati6nal staff
representative, assisted by a local worker. In Marion
County, for example, Jan Goodman, a member of the national
staff, and Sylvia Zazas, an Indianapolis resident, were in
charge. The local worker, assumed to be less experienced,
was in a somewhat subordinate position. (2) Finally, there
was a state coordinator in charge of overseeing the entire
Indiana campaign operation.
Most of the legwork of the McCarthy effort was to
be handled at the grass roots level. In the various store-
front offices, activities were to be coordinated by one
McCarthy staff person and one local worker. The storefronts
were to provide the contact between the campaign and its
individual supporters within a defined geographical area;
each storefront was in charge of a specific portion of its
district - approximately three wards, though this varied
somewhat. In Indianapolis, for example, all the storefronts
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received the names of existing contacts in their area.
They had the original HDA lists, the names of the precinct
committemen and vice-committeemen whom they were to con-
tact, and the names of those persons who had signed
petitions or attended the HDA dinner. (3)
The storefronts were also intended to serve as
publicity arms for the McCarthy organization. Storefront
workers were to make and distribute posters and fliers in
order to publicize various local events, and to work the
telephones on McCarthy's behalf. They were responsible for
organizing rallies in their areas at which various visiting
dignitaries, such as Paul Newman, would speak.
In addi~on, the storefronts were scheduled to serve
as distribution centers for newly arriving students. At such
centers the students would be shown maps of the area and
given canvassing assignments. The overall strategy of
activities in these centers was to be the responsibUity of
the area coordinators.
Operating alongside but functioning quite separately
from this main organization would be Women for McCarthy. This
group would have its own mailing and telephone lists and would
handle its own finances and publicity; (4) it even had its
own national newsletter. Women for McCarthy was also to be
headed by a national staff worker. (5) The group planned to
carry out its own activities, the major one being a luncheon
honoring Mrs. McCarthy.
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Meanwhile, the national organization, situated
at the Marott Hotel was making plans for future campaigns,
raising money nationally, and scheduling McCarthy for
appearances around the country.
Ideally, then, the preceding pa~agraphs describe
the organizational structure of the McCarthy campaign in
Indiana. However, along with organization must go a
fundamental strategy to guide day-to-day activities. A
debate over strategy which began in Wisconsin was to continue
in Indiana. This debate revolved primarily around the role
of the black community in the campaign.
No one really believed that McCarthy could get a
large portion of the Negro vote, but many individuals whose
commitment to civil rights was as great as their commitment
to peace in vietnam felt that campaign spokesmen should
announce strong support of Negro grievances, and that they
should address themselves more frequently to the black
communi ty. (6) The approach finally adopted was the so-called
"rural strategy, II (7) described:;tr,y'the New York Times as
follows: "Since the Negro vote is lost to McCarthy they
(the campaign managers) will be concentrating the campaign
in the smaller cities and towns where it is believed there
is both anti-war and anti-Bobby sentiment. II (8) This
strategy meshed with a tactical plan evolved in Indiana -
that the McCarthy campaign should especially attempt to woo
the Branigin supporters in their rural strongholds. (9) In
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Indianapolis this meant that major efforts would be directed
toward white suburbia. Such theoretical planning, however,
did not work out in practice for the McCarthy forces.
HOW THE ORGANIZATION ACTUALLY FUNCTIONED
Leadership. The Indiana campaign was not at all
well organized. At~ the close of the Indiana primary, on
May 8, 1968, James Armstrong wrote a letter to Senator
McCarthy which said in part: "There must be strong pro-
fessional coordination of strategy, of scheduling, worker
training, and deployment of staff. Hoosiers for a Democratic
Alternative could hardly wait for your 'team' to arrive in
Indiana from Wisconsin. We knew that the arrival of the
McCarthy 'forces' would set our amateur house in order.
but if anything the disorder increased as Primary Day
approached. " (10) This lack of organization was observed on
many levels by different campaign workers.
First of all, there was a great deal of confusion
about who was in charge of the campaign. No one seems to
have been clear about this. On the one hand James Bogle
was the "campaign manager" for Citizens for McCarthy, but
on the other hand there was also a national staff; its
members were locked in a power struggle, which made even less
clear the question of who was in charge. Curt Ganz and Blair
Clark were vying for position at this level. (11) In addition,
Richard Grandjeans, a national staff worker, was reportedly
in charge of Indiana. (1) Among those individuals interviewed
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for this paper, the~e were varying responses to the question
of who was in charge. Merle Miller, chairman of Citizens
for McCarthy, commented that Bogle "ran the whole show."
Others seemed to feel that either Ganz(12) or Clark(13) was
in charge. The most cornmon observation, however, was that
the organization was leaderless. (14) Everyone was disturbed
about the fact that no functioning chaf.n.vof authority
existed within the entire campaign organization. (15)
There seem to have been conflicts of authority at
other levels as well. Armstrong went on in his letter to
say: "There appeared to be a great deal of internal warfare
and jockeying for position. Budding Secretaries of State
and cabinet members were falling allover one another." (16)
The coordinators of the various areas (finance, press, etc.)
spent a great deal of their time bickering with each other
and frequently failed to coordinate at all. (17) Professional
organizers had to be shipped to Indiana from New York to save
the Simon and Garfunkle concert from financial disaster;
the two persons in charge of that event were so busy fighting
each other tha:t no one had been out publicizing the concert. (18)
There are at least two theories about why this
infighting occurred. After the Wisconsin primary, according
to Bogle, it appeared for the first time that Eugene r.1cCarthy
might in fact become President of the United States. As a
result, many individuals who had previously been entirely
issue-oriented now became position-oriented also. There was
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now a new importance to having top staff positions in the
McCarthy organization. There was the chance of obtaining
real political power, or so people thought. Al Edelson
analyzed the situation somewhat differently by comparing the
McCarthy and Kennedy organizations. Edelson considered the
Kennedy campaign to be highly disciplined, well-structured
and non-ideological; it possessed definite lines of
authority, and when orders were given they were followed,
with no questions asked. In contrast, the McCarthy organiza-
tion, according to Edelson, was made up of people unused to
being abruptly ordered around. They all wanted to be chiefs,
and as a result were quite short on Indians. (20) Whatever
the reason, there seems to be little doubt that the result
was chaos. In his book, McCarthy for President, Arthur Herzog
summed it up this way:
"Behind the smiling posters of the
candidate in Indiana, the campaign was breaking up into
warring groups." (21)
In additbn to problems of authority, there was
some question concerning the competence of those in charge.
The age and experience of those running the campaign brought
criticism from many. Armstrong, in the letter previously
mentioned, referred to this factor: "The 'children's crusade'
is the(~greatest thing about your campaign. This is the 'new
politics' you refer to. However, I know of many 'old' people
(thirty and beyond) whose enthusiastic response was blunted
by the flippant disorganization of headquarters and storefronts
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that reflected little, if any, maturity. Use these
youngsters and rejoice in their enthusiasm, but this dare
not be 'their"campaign; not if you are to be President of
the United States. Seasoned maturity needs to be recruited,
used where such leadership can be visibly helpful, and
relied upon where certain kinds of decision-making and
policy-making are called for. II (22) Edelson referred to the
national staff as "eager, intelligent, young, and not
competent for the job at hand." (23) Another person put it
people, but they were neither pros nor from the area. (24)
this way: "The young people who ran things were capable
This opinion was not, however, unanimous; sylvia Zazas, for
example, felt that the "staff people were far superior to
their local counterparts.,,(25)
Local McCarthy supporters, who did not seem to have
much contact with Ganz, Clark, or Grandjeans, had little to
say about them. But James Bogle certainlY was not popular
in Indianapolis. He emerged as the scapegoat of the campaign.
It was said that he was a spendthrift, (26) irresponsible, (27)
and a glory-seeker. (28) However, it is also true that Indiana-
polis people had little contact with Bogle. As a matter of
fact, many claimed they had met him only briefly, and did not
know what he did with his time. (29)
There waS also criticism of Senator McCarthy's
personal role in Indiana. His frequent failure to arrive at
various events on time may have been beyond his control, but
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many commented that he did not appear to think that it
mattered. Kirk McKinney, for example, arranged a fund-
raising cocktail party for the senator. The honored guest
was two hours late and did not seem to consider it important. (30)
Needless to say, McKinney was irritated. On another occasion,
all the Democrat precinct committeemen and vice-committeemen
in Marion County gathered to meet Senator McCarthy. He was
a couple of hours late and reportedly, once again, rather
cool about it all. He came in, shook a few hands, did not
put himself out at all, and then left. In addition, the
Senator refused to involve· himself in inn~r staff disputes
which plagued his organization in Indianapolis. However,
Senator McCarthy was reportedly not well during the Indiana
campaign. (31)
Recruitmentand Use of Manpower. If an office
reflects anything about the effectiveness of a campaign,
trouble should be spotted at that level rather quickly. One
volunteer had the following to report about a day she spent
at state headquarters. She was requested to come and help,
but she passed the entire day going from one job to another,
never doing any of them. First she was to type for a writer;
he never got his article written. Then she was to drive some
students somewhere; after waiting for them, she discovered
they had found a truck. "It was like that all day," she
said. (32) Kirk McKinney claimed that it was "disheartening
to visit there" because of such disorganization. (33) Thirty
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or forty people would have a meeting trying to figure out
McCarthy's itinerary, when one competent person should have
sat down and done it. McKinney suggested that ten Kelly
girls could really do the job, but was told that the
"vitality of the organization was in its volunteers." A
student who had worked in Wisconsin also remarked, in a
comparison of the two states, that in "Indianapolis the
central headquarters was a mess." In the meantime, the volun-
teers were discouraged because they felt that their efforts,
even when utilized, did not fit into any coherent scheme of
things. (34) Volunteers were not properly set to work because,
"no one knew what to do with them," (35) yet the campaign was
perpetually short on manpower. (36)
Students were more difficult to recruit than in
Wisconsin or New Hampshire; in Indiana there was a definite
decline in their number. (37) According to Lydia Gross,
assistant coordinator for students in Indiana, there were
three reasons for this: (1) the time of the Indiana primary
was closer to final examinations; (2) Kennedy's entrance into
the race; and (3) President Johnson's withdrawal. (38)
The students' disaffiliation and growing lack of
enthusiasm was particularly noticeable at the storefront
level of operations.
The students were the ones who could leave school,
pull up stakes, and work for subsistence pay. However, most
of them were from out of town. Though the plan of organization
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was to have one local student and one from out of town,
in practice at least five of the storefronts were run by
two national staffers. (39)
Local older people were rarely involved in the
inner workings and decisions of storefront operations.
Bill Conours, a local worker, age 20, who served as coordina-
tor of the East Washington Street storefront, commented that
one of their problems was how to keep local volunteers busy
on anything but licking envelopes and pasting stamps. (40)
Sue Craig, a long time peace activist who had been on the
board of Hoosiers for Peace, had worked in HDA, and was also
a Democratic vice-committeewoman, visited the storefront near
her when it first opened and was told there was nothing for
her to do. She was only called once by the coordinator in
her area, a week and a half before the election, and asked
to contact committeemen. It is true that she was contacted
a second time "because the press was coming and they needed
people around to lobk like they were working." But after
the press left, so did Mrs. Craig, "because there was
nothing to do." (41)
Since local people were not given sufficient
opportunity to help with storefront activities, a great deal
of responsibility and work was left to the coordinators.
To find a suitable place of operations, they looked in busy
areas for offices that would be visible to the public. After
decorating the rooms, they began organizing for something
specific; such as Paul Newman's visit. The popular Hollywood
actor was scheduled to open all of the storefronts in
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Indianapolis with a personal appearance. In preparations
for this event, fliers were distributed, although most of
the storefront areas were huge and could not be thoroughly
covered by two people. The coordinators also telephoned all
of their local contacts. (42) Unfortunately, they had no
sound trucks to use, nor were any other means of announcing
the event used.
The Newman rallies were not a success. In the
black section of town the response was poor (about a dozen
people came to the College Avenue storefront); in the white
areas the response was better - 50 to 100 persons - but they
were mostly high school students. (43)
Once the storefronts were opened, most of their
work was in preparation for canvassing. (44) All of the names
on the voting lists from James Beatty's office were pasted
vertically on large pieces of cardboard. Beside each name
were four or five categories to check (definite, not sure,
no, etc.). The coordinators also had to find places for the
canvassers to stay and food fori··themto eat (sandwich-
making was a main function of many a local volunteer). Once
the canvassers had gone through an area, it then became the
job of the storefront to follow through. Workers called or
visited those whose responses were favorable or uncertain.
The storefronts were also responsible for organizing
informal "coffee" get-togethers in their areas. Bill Conours
organized at least ten of these. Storefront workers served
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coffee at the plant gates of various factories, distributed
fliers, and talked to people about HcCarthy.
One of the best storefronts in Harion county was
the one directed by Rose Davis in Barrington (45) (a small
ghetto on the far southside of Indianapolis.) It was
successful because it became a neighborhood center and all
sorts of people felt welcome to come there with their
problems. However, Mrs. Davis became frustrated by her
inability to transfer this enthusiasm to the McCarthy
campaign. (46)
Because the storefront coordinators had so much to
do they sometimes neglected areas that the local people felt
were important. In some areas committeemen were not contacted
at all, or only very late in the campaign. In Bill Conours'
area workers contacted "as many as possible." But this was
an almost overwhelming task: to organize approximately three
wards with a staff of two in only a few weeks. A great deal
of the responsibility of the campaign was in the hands of a
few very inexperienced people.
On election day the storefronts were responsible
for manning what polls they could, and for finding people
with cars available for driving individuals to their voting
places. Here their lack of contact with local people hurt
considerably. Many polls were never covered and some people
who would have been willing to be at the polls were never
asked. (47) The storefront coordinators had far too many
41
responsibilities and little back-up manpower. Their short-
comings were due mainly to a poor division of labor.
In addition to the storefront contacts, the women
had their own organization, Women for McCarthy. Women for
McCarthy was also somewhat leaderless. Midge Miller, who
had come from Wisconsin to organize the group, was suffering
from overexertion and fatigue, and left the campaign for a
rest after being in Indiana for a week or so. (48)
One of the original ideas of Women for HcCarthy
was to have informal neighborhood teas. However, the workers
did not have the necessary contacts to make this tactic
work. (49) In being a part of Women for McCarthy, many women
were at the same time cut off from other activities in the
campaign. (50) A great deal of Women for McCarthy's effort
in Indiana was centered on a fund-raising brunch for Mrs.
McCarthy. Hundreds of volunteer manhours went into compiling
the mailing list for this event. Each of the 4,000 names
collected was placed on an index card, and as many invita-
tions sent out - but only 175 attended the luncheon. Sylvia
Zazas, commenting on this disappointing showing, felt that
the 175 names could have been obtained by a few individuals
putting their heads together, since most of those who
attended were already comrmirt.t.e d and their names were on
existing mailing lists. Sue Craig, in criticizing the
luncheon, believed that the manpower should have been used
in the precincts. On the other hand, Pat Ulen, one of the
luncheon organizers, said that receiving an invitation to a
gathering in honor of Mrs. McCarthy may well have been as
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effective as a knock on 4,000 doors. Howeve~ many of the
women willing to address envelopes were not so willing to
go out and knock on doors.
In sum, many local people - especially students
and housewives - felt rather frustrated at the end of the
McCarthy campaign in Indiana. They knew that their talents
and time could have been put to better use in a well-organized
campaign. However, organizational problems and lack of time
meant that their abilities were never properly utilized.
STRATEGY
In theory, at least, there was a strategy for the
McCarthy campaign - a rural strategy, and a strategy which
said "Go after the Branigin votes." However, in Indianapolis
such plans were never really put into practice. In most cases
no one was informed of any strategy. (52) In fact, the strategy
as carried out seemed to be almost the reverse. One would
have thought it was a Kennedy rather than a McCarthy organiza-
tion. Because, regardless of the conclusion that the Negro
vote could not be won, the HcCarthy forces still tried to win
it. Of the twelve storefronts (in Marion County the thirteenth
Was the storefront for the county coordinators Jan Goodman
and sylvia Zazas), six were in predominately black areas - 119
West 34th Street, 729 Indiana Avenue, 29th and Clifton, 19th
and College, 30th and Sherman, and 1741 A Minoquin (the
Barrington storefront). In Marion County the percentage of
Negroes is slightly less than twenty per cent, yet fifty per
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cent of the storefront manpower was concentrated on Negro
areas. Why this occurred is not exactly clear, though part
of the answer is connected with the very concept of a store-
front. Of necessity, a storefront must be situated in a
congested, low-rental area, if the campaign is to be able
to afford "visible" space. One McCarthy staffer gave other
reasons for the concentration of storefronts in black areas.
First, she said that the person in charge of the Negro
community, Mr. Rosenthal, was a go-getter, and picked some
of the storefront locations himself. Second, she felt that
it was all done so hurriedly that there was probably little
planning involved: "You got the storefronts where they were
the most easily available. II (53) However, regardless of the
reasoning, when one considers~the wide and varied responsi-
bilities of the storefronts and their crucial role in
contacting the people, the inescapable conclusion is that
they were misplaced in terms of the overall strategy of
the campaign.
The storefronts were not the only area where there
appeared to be a concentration of activity in the ghetto,
despite a strategy to the contrary. One of the first pro-
jects of both the Kennedy and McCarthy forces in Indiana was
the registration of unregistered voters. Bill Conours was
one of the new full-time McCarthy people who was qualified
as a registrar. (54) According to Conours, registration
activities of the McCarthy workers were concentrated in the
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ghetto. He reports having left his storefront empty on a
number of occasions ~n order to spend the day registering
black voters. He also spent some time registering voters
at Indiana University's Indianapolis campus and at the
Butler University campus. So far as he knew, the McCarthy
campaign had every intention of concentrating considerable
effort in the black community. According to Conours, this
continued until the last week of the campaign, when the
workers realized it was a lost cause and halted most of
their efforts in the ghetto.
Money was also put into the ghetto. Though the
amount is undetermined, there were paid workers in the third
ward of Indianapolis on election day. (55) Despite all of
this activity in the black areas, some campaigners continued
to feel that the McCarthy effort was not concentrating enough
of its effort there. (56)
However, the evidence seems to indicate that in
Indianapolis a policy of deemphasizing the black population
would have been the wisest in terms of votes. There are a
number of incidentS to illustrate this. McCarthy's first
speech in Indianapolis foIbwing the HDA dinner was in the
black community. (57)
"It was a fiasco." The turn-out was
embarrassingly small and McCarthy was as a result reluctant
to return. (58) Then on April 18 a luncheon was arranged at
the Fall Creek YMCA. at which McCarthy addressed a gathering
of black leaders in Indianapolis. Though the meeting did not
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go badly, it received poor publicity in an article by
Kenworthy of the New York Times. This was the final
blow - the strategy at the upper levels would no longer be
to court the black vote. (59) What remaining events were
scheduled in the Negro community of Indianapolis continued
to fail. Bandleader Benny Goodman, in Indianapolis for a
concert at Clowes Hal~ agreed to tour the city with his
band on a truck on Indiana Avenue. (60) He and those
accompanying him were taunted and stoned until fear of
physical harm drove them from the streets. (61) Finally, in
the Third Ward, where there was registration, canvassing,
a storefront, and a ward chairman who tacitly supported the
candidate, (62) the disappointing returns for McCarthy bore
out the harshest prognosis of the hopelessness of a McCarthy
effort in the ghetto.
There was confusion on many levels of the McCarthy
organization; as a result, a great deal of hard work came to
naught. The best plans laid in any political effort, parti-
cularly one so dependent upon volunteers, are bound to go
astray. But when there is little or no clear direction or
leadership, as was the case in Indiana, such irresponsibility
cannot help but affect the results at the polls.
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Chapter Six
FINANCES AND PUBLICITY
The Indiana campaign was financed largely from outside
the state. Actually, Citizens for McCarthy fell short of
the original expectation that it would be a large fund-raising
organization. Only one person, a very busy Mr. Tom Scanlon,
was assigned the task of raising money. According to the
organization~ report filed with the Secretary of State of
Indiana on June 19, 1968, the citizens committee raised a
total of $22,851.58.Xl) This included $3,000 sent to them
by McCarthy supporters in Detroit, indicating that $19,851.58
was raised locally. However, McKinney, the treasurer, pointed
out that some local money was sent directly to the national
organization.
The money raised by Citizens for McCarthy was strictly
in the form of indi vilduaL:donations. The group held no money
making events. Altogether, 479 individuals contributed;
forty of those we re in the $lOO-plus bracket; five individuals
gave $1,000 or more.
The Citizens for McCarthy accounts were kept separate
from those of the national organization. All of the local
group's funds were disbursed by McKinney, who kept a tight
reign over everything. He insisted on authorizing all expendi-
tures, and would pay only those bills that he had authorized. (2)
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The largest disbursements made by Citizens for
McCarthy were to Pollack and Associates, a local firm which
handled part of the advertising. This firm received
$5,197.26 for advertisements in the Indianapolis Star and
Indianapolis News; $300 for television spots in Muncie;
and $700 for radio time in Indianapolis. The next largest
expenditure was for the Women for McCarthy's luncheon for
Mrs. McCarthy. This cost $1,002.50: $240 for postage,
$384.74 for invitations, and $378.80 for food. (There is
no report concerning how much the luncheon collected, but
it was a definite loss.) Finally, $266 was paid to Hoosier
Air Lines for the use of chartered planes. These were the
group's major expenditures. (3)
The activities of Citizens for McCarthy were, however,
a very small part of the overall campaign. The national
organization disbursed $302,590 in Indiana. Its largest
expenditure was also for advertising - $170,000 to Carl Ally,
Inc. Other major expenditures were $87,590 for "operating
expenses," $25,000 to pollack Associates for the newspaper
supplement which appeared in the Indianapolis Star the week-
end before the primary, $12,700 in wages for staff, $3,165.91
for rental of rooms and $7,200 in "cash payments to workers."
Another $5,000 was sent ahead to Oregon.
In addition to funds paid by Citizens for McCarthy
and by the headquarters of McCarthy for President, a total
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of $1,246.48 was listed as "Gross Proceeds from Fund
Raising." The assumption is that this money was raised
mainly at the Simon and Garfunkel concert (the only really
successful fund raising event in Indianapolis) (4) with some
additional money coming from smaller events, such as the
Old-Fashioned Picnic(5) and the luncheon for Mrs. McCarthy.
In all, then, the McCarthy campaign in Indiana was
certainly not under-financed. In 1967, James Davis wrote in
his book, Springboard to the White House: Presidential
Primaries: How They Are Fought and Won, that it took "perhaps
as much as $200,000 to run in one primary. ,,(6) John Kennedy
only spent $100,000 in the West Virginia primary in 1960. (7)
The McCarthy headquarters alone reported spending $321,599.86
in Indiana. Though this may be considerably less than the
$494,000 they reportedly spent in Wisconsin, (8) it certainly
is not meager. (9)
Confusion and over-spending were an important part of
the financial problems in Indiana. There never seemed to be
enough cash available when it was needed. (10) This was due
to an internal fight over the control of the money. (11) The
New York Times on April 27, 1968, reported the following
situation: $25,000 was still owed in New Hampshire; $100,000
in Wisconsin; the eighteen salaried staff people in Indiana
had not been paid during the preceding few weeks; the 220
full-time, non-salaried staff, each of whom received $5 a
day for meals plus room allowance, were paid the previous
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week for the first time in two weeks; and the organization
did not know if it would have transportation money for out
of town canvassers. (12)
The only person interviewed for this paper who seemed
to feel that finances were not a serious problem was Pollack.
He received his money directly from Howard Stein, who had
raised his own separate funds for advertising. (13)
According to McKinney who had served as treasurer for
many a political campaign, "most campaigns overspend, but
this one did greatly more than normal." The telephone bill
of $85,000, which remains unpaid today, is the most notorious
example of overspending in the campaign, (14) but there were
also lost cars and lost equipment, to cite additional
examples. (15)
Thus, although eventually there was a large amount of
money spent in Indiana, the campaign operated in a constant
state of financial crisis.
The area of public relations was one of the weakest
features of the campaign. Part of the problem was poor
scheduling. First, there was no one person in charge of
scheduling throughout the campaign; it was a job that tended
to shift about. (16) Second, there were numerous "off again,
on again trips because of differences bound up in policy
decisions.,,(17) Third, "those who made out the schedules
PUBLIC RELATIONS
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planned too many engagements because there was no one with
the authority over them to say no." (18)
There were constant reports of late arrivals and last
minute cancellations. (19) One such incident occurred in
Indianapolis in Bill Conours' area. The staff at the East
Washington Street storefront spent a full week of their time
planning for a rally and speech to be given by the Senator
at the Eastgate Shopping Center. They were very excited
because they felt that in the particular white middle-and
working-class area where they were situated, a personal
appearance would be very important. An hour or so before
the event Conours heard the rumor that the speech had been
cancelled. He rushed to the headquarters, where the report
was confirmed. Subsequently he was unable to convince anyone
to reschedule the appearance. Nearly 1,000 people carne to
listen to the senator, who unfortunately never arrived. (20)
On those occasions when McCarthy did speak, reporters
were handicapped because they were not given advance texts.
All of the press release transcripts filed in McCarthy head-
quarters after the primary - with two exceptions - included
places where "inaudible" had been written into the transcript.
This practice was changed after the Indiana primary. (21)
There was considerable disagreement among McCarthy's
top staffers concerning what type of television spots would
be best for Indiana. Many people were unhappy with the
television spots prepared by Carl Ally, the New York advertising
51
agency handling McCarthy's national campaign. They felt
that the advertisements were too sophisticated fur Indiana.
Merle Miller, chairman of Citizens for McCarthy ,whose name
appeared on all of the advertisements in Indiana, was one
such individual. Because his name was being used, he inter-
jected himself into the debate. (22) Bill and Kay Nee,
advertisers from Minnesota led the charge against the Ally
firms "too sophisticated" approach.
The Ally firm agreed to make required changes; a new
film was to be prepared and sent to Indiana. Larner relates
that the new commercials "mysteriously disappeared," and
attributes this to some sort of a conspiracy. (23) Actually,
Pollack was perhaps central to this. He reports that the
films were both on hand, and that he was asked to call the
television station, cancel the old film, and request that the
new one be shown in its place. The station, however, would
not make the change without authority from Ally in New York.
"They called New York and got some underling who said no
change." The old spot ran, and Ally was fired during the
Indiana campaign. (24)
Trouble in other areas can be withstood, but when such
confusion crops up in the crucial area of the press relations,
particularly television, which received the bulk of the
campaign funds, such inefficiency hits at the very heart of
a campaign. It is easy to see why many people associated with
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the McCarthy effort felt uneasy. They seemed to be
surrounded by confusion - money was never available, and
top staffers frequently did not even know where their
candidate was.
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CONCLUSION
A good deal of what happened to Senator McCarthy
ln Indiana can be viewed as the results of a campaign which,
although adequately financed, was basically run by young
amateurs. In Indiana they were confronted with a tough non-
ideological political batt~e, which they came into with an
"undefeatable complex.,,(l) James Q. Wilson, in his book The
Amateur Democrat, analyzes and defines the amateur in politics
in a way that is useful in understanding many of the problems
of the McCarthy campaign.
Who are the amateur reformers? "For the most part
they are young, well-educated, professional people, including
a large number of women. In style of life they are distinctly
middle and upper-middle class.,,(2) This certainly applied to
the Indianapolis people involved. (3) Wilson goes on to
analyze the limitations of such a group within the Democratic
Party. "In general there are six major groups within the
Democratic Party which for a variety of reasons are not
attracted to the club movement. These are the Negroes,
Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans, organized labor, big
financial contributors and the professional politicians .
the orientations of the clubs to the intellectual middle-
class means that the political style and rhetoric of the
organization are not felt congenial by groups which in
total represent the bulk of the electoral support of the
54
Democratic Party." (4) Many of the .McCarthy strategists
realized their weakness in reaching many of these groups
early. For example, the one area in New Hampshire where
they did poorly was in its industrial and largest city,
Manchester. (5) In Indiana Kennedy's entrance made their
task even more difficult as he had positive appeal to
exactly those groups the McCarthy campaign style failed to
exci te.
But most significant in terms of the internal workings
of the McCarthy campaign in Indiana, the issue was gone.
Wilson in further analyzing the amateur says that he is "one
who finds politics intrinsically interesting because it
expresses a conception of the public interest . . . he sees
the political world in terms of ideas and principles rather
than in terms of persons. II (6) Every person interviewed for
this paper, with one exception, was in this campaign because
of their unhappiness with President Johnson's handling of
the war in vietnam. (7) With that issue diminished and another
"anti-war" candidate in the race, it could not help but affect
their dedication. But perhaps more important, with the issue
gone and the prospects of potential power increasing, the
national staff did in fact turn from issues to personality
and the inner power conflicts within the organization now
became paramount. The professional politican used to such
conflicts, while participating in them, is still able to do
the job at hand. But the McCarthy staffer, frequently allowed
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the power-plays to dominate their energies. This resulted
in a lack of direction for the campaign. What lines of
authority there had been in the McCarthy campaign were all
in contest. As a result, such crucial questions as: How to
best utilize local talents; How to implement a strategy on
all levels, once it was determined; and how to disburse funds
were never properly dealt with.
Considering Senator McCarthy's opponents and the
campaigns organizational shortcomings, only the continued
dedication and commitment of a large number of students and
many others could be responsible for the 29% of the vote
McCarthy finally received in Indiana.
Footnotes to the Conclusion
(1) Bogle interview.
(2) Wilson, James Q., The Amateur Democrat, The
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962,
p. 13.
(3) Though attempts were made, the Indianapolis people
were never able to involve either Negroes or union
people. It always remained an organization of white
college graduates or students.
(4) Wilson, £E. cit., p. 268.
(5) New York Times, May 15, 1968, p. 26. According to
this article, in six of the labor wards in Manchester
the president received 71% of the vote. President
Johnson carried Manchester by 70%.
(6) Wilson, op. cit., p. 4.
(7) The one exception was Al Edelson.
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